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THE “PERIPHERAL PLAINTIFF”: DUTY
DETERMINATIONS IN TAKE-HOME ASBESTOS
CASES
Yelena Kotlarsky*
Since the 1970s, litigation concerning the dangers of asbestos in the
workplace has transformed from a few workers’ compensation claims to
hundreds of thousands of lawsuits against companies in nearly every
industry. While the typical plaintiff in these claims is an employee injured
while handling asbestos at the worksite, a new class of “peripheral
plaintiffs” has recently emerged. These plaintiffs consist of family members
who are exposed to asbestos after inhaling the dust that saturates an
employee’s person and clothing. The family members then bring claims
against the employers and the owners of the premises claiming that they
were negligent in allowing the workers to carry asbestos home when the
danger of asbestos was well known.
The highest courts of six states stand divided on whether an employer or
premises owner owes a duty to these third-party plaintiffs to protect them
from asbestos-related harm. Two states have relied heavily on the
foreseeability of the harm to hold that landowners and employers do owe a
duty to third-party plaintiffs. On the other hand, four states have focused on
a range of factors, like the lack of a relationship between the parties and
the need to constrain asbestos litigation, to hold that landowners and
employers do not owe a duty to third-party plaintiffs.
This Note examines the interstate conflict and concludes that all six
courts have engaged in an unclear and unnecessarily fact-specific analysis
of duty. It argues that the Third Restatement’s method of determining duty
represents a clearer approach, because it sends factual questions to the
jury and encourages courts to take “no duty” decisions more seriously.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the course of Anthony Olivo’s thirty-seven-year career as a pipe
welder, he routinely came into contact with asbestos in materials like pipe
covering and gaskets.1 At the end of every work day, Mr. Olivo came
home, took off his clothing, and left it next to the washing machine located
in the basement of the home that he shared with his wife Eleanor.2 Every
evening, Mrs. Olivo would wash these clothes so that her husband could
1. Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1146 (N.J. 2006).
2. Id.
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wear them the next day.3 Sixteen years after Mr. Olivo retired, doctors
diagnosed Mrs. Olivo with mesothelioma,4 and she died shortly afterward.5
Mr. Olivo then brought a wrongful death action against, among other
defendants, the owners of the premises on which he worked.6
These types of “take-home” asbestos cases are coming on the heels of
hundreds of thousands of claims and decades of litigation about the dangers
of asbestos exposure.7 Asbestos was once lauded for its fire-resistant
properties,8 but became heavily regulated when researchers discovered that
inhalation of its fibers could lead to a wide range of respiratory diseases,
including cancer.9
Backed by epidemiological studies and supported by strict regulations of
asbestos in the workplace promulgated by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), many employees who had been exposed to
asbestos at their workplace felt empowered to bring claims.10 By 1997,
these employees began suing everyone from asbestos manufacturers to
more “peripheral defendants,”11 like premises owners and third-party
product manufacturers, in what the Supreme Court called an “asbestoslitigation crisis.”12
More recently, asbestos litigation has seen the growth of not only the
“peripheral defendant,” but also the “peripheral plaintiff.”13 These
plaintiffs consist of family members who become exposed to asbestos from
inhaling asbestos dust on an employee’s person or work clothes, and who
bring claims against employers and premises owners for negligence.14
State courts stand divided on whether employers and premises owners owe
3. Id.
4. “Mesothelioma” is a cancer that affects the lining of the chest or abdomen. See Fact
Sheet: Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/
cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos (last visited Sept. 21, 2012); see also infra notes 118–20
and accompanying text.
5. Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1146.
6. Id.
7. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS
LITIGATION COST AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT vi (2002), available
at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/DB397.pdf; see
also infra notes 154–58 and accompanying text.
8. See John E. Craighead et al., Mineralogy of Asbestos, in ASBESTOS AND ITS DISEASES
23, 23 (John E. Craighead & Allen R. Gibbs eds., 2008); see also infra notes 95–100 and
accompanying text.
9. See generally John E. Craighead, Diseases Associated with Asbestos Industrial
Products and Environmental Exposure, in ASBESTOS AND ITS DISEASES, supra note 8, at 39,
39 (detailing the different diseases suffered by workers who handled asbestos in various
industries); see also infra notes 117–29 and accompanying text.
10. See Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Triumph and
Failure of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 259 (2006); see also infra notes
106–09, 145 and accompanying text.
11. See Mark A. Behrens & Frank Cruz-Alvarez, A Potential New Frontier in Asbestos
Litigation: Premises Owner Liability for “Take Home” Exposure Claims, MEALEY’S LITIG.
REP.: ASBESTOS, July 5, 2006, at 1; see also infra notes 159–70 and accompanying text.
12. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
13. See Behrens & Cruz-Alvarez, supra note 11, at 1; see also infra Part II.C.
14. See Mark A. Behrens, What’s New in Asbestos Litigation?, 28 REV. LITIG. 501, 545–
49 (2009); see also infra notes 179–86 and accompanying text.
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a duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs to protect them from asbestosrelated diseases.15
This Note addresses the state conflict regarding whether employees and
premises owners owe a duty to these “peripheral plaintiffs.” Part I begins
by giving an overview of the negligence cause of action and then examines
different approaches courts have taken when deciding duty. Part II details
the history of asbestos and the exponential growth of asbestos litigation.
Part III discusses the conflict among six state courts regarding whether
employers and premises owners owe a duty of reasonable care toward takehome asbestos plaintiffs. Finally, Part IV argues that all six courts
employed the wrong standard they determined duty, and advocates the
method proposed by the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
I. THEORIES OF LIABILITY FOR ASBESTOS EXPOSURE
When a court faces an asbestos personal injury claim, it must decide
whether the defendant—either an employer, premise owner, or
manufacturer—negligently exposed the plaintiff to harm from asbestoscontaining products or was strictly liable for producing those products.16
Part I.A describes the basic elements of negligence: duty, breach,
causation, and injury. Part I.B explains the element of duty in greater
detail, examining the factors that courts have used in their determinations of
duty. Finally, Part I.C looks at the cause of action for strict liability.
A. The Basics of Negligence
Plaintiffs who suffer an injury as a result of asbestos exposure need to
prove that the defendant was negligent—meaning that the defendant failed
to exercise reasonable care toward them.17 Accordingly, plaintiffs must
satisfy the four prima facie elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation,
and injury.18 The plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed a duty of
15. Compare Price v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162 (Del. 2011) (holding
that employers do not owe a duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs), CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. 2005) (holding that employers do not owe a duty to takehome asbestos plaintiffs), In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex.,
740 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 2007) (holding that premises owners do not owe a duty to takehome asbestos plaintiffs), and In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005)
(holding that premises owners do not owe a duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs), with
Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006) (holding that premises owners owe
a duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs), and Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266
S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008) (holding that employers owe a duty to take-home asbestos
plaintiffs).
16. See Price, 26 A.3d at 166–67 (discussing the standard for negligence); Braaten v.
Saberhagen Holdings, 198 P.3d 493, 497–500 (Wash. 2008) (discussing the standard for
strict products liability).
17. E.g., Price, 26 A.3d at 166–67; Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 355.
18. See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS
TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 72 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010). One potentially confusing aspect of
negligence is that the term carries two meanings: negligent behavior and negligence as a
cause of action. Thus, while a person’s behavior could be negligent, this does not mean that
he is liable for the tort of negligence, because he may not have a duty to the person harmed
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care to a person like the plaintiff, that the defendant breached that duty, and
that this breach caused the plaintiff’s harm.19
1. Duty
“Duty” in negligence cases examines the standard of reasonable conduct
that defendants must engage in to avoid harming others.20 Duty is
essentially an obligation to observe a particular course of action in relation
to others.21 For example, drivers owe a duty to other people who use the
roads: to not cause them physical harm.22 Courts will often consider
whether the defendant should have foreseen that his conduct would cause
harm to the plaintiff.23 In addition to considering whether the defendant
could foresee causing harm to the plaintiff, courts recognize a duty based on
a “special relationship” between the defendant and the plaintiff.24 Whether
a defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff is a question of law determined by a
judge.25 This Note will discuss duty in greater detail in Part I.B below.
2. Breach
If a judge determines that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, the
jury then decides whether the defendant breached that duty.26 A defendant
breaches his duty if he fails to conform to the reasonable standard of care
under the circumstances.27 Breach exists as a separate element from duty,
and a plaintiff must independently satisfy breach to allow a negligence
claim to go forward.28

or his negligent behavior may not have been a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. See
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at 269 (2000).
19. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 72; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
20. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 324 (4th ed.
1971); see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 77–78.
21. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 53, at 324.
22. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 77; see also PROSSER, supra note 20, § 53,
at 324 (noting that a driver has a duty to an approaching car to “moderate his speed, to keep
a proper lookout, or to blow his horn”).
23. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 78; see also infra notes 59–62 and
accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of foreseeability in duty determinations).
24. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 82; see also infra notes 52–54 and
accompanying text.
25. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 77; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 (2005).
26. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 37, at 207. Judges can sometimes decide breach as a
matter of law but only when no reasonable jury would determine otherwise. Id.; see also
Mair v. C & O R.R., 851 F.2d 829, 832 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the lower court erred in
sending the question of breach to the jury when no reasonable juror would find that the
defendant breached its duty of care to the plaintiff).
27. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 30, at 143; DOBBS, supra note 18, § 114, at 270.
28. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and
Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 744
(2005) (noting that if a defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, but did not breach that duty,
no negligence will be found. Additionally, if the defendant acted unreasonably, but had no
duty to the plaintiff, then the defendant also would not be negligent).
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Juries take into account a myriad of factors when they determine
breach.29 In considering the reasonable standard of care under the
circumstances, foreseeability often plays a large role.30 A defendant did not
breach his duty of care if a reasonable person31 could not have foreseen the
harm or could not have reasonably avoided it.32 Juries can also consider
whether the usefulness of a defendant’s conduct outweighs the risks it
creates for others;33 in other words, juries weigh the costs and benefits of a
particular course of action. If the probability and extent of the harm
outweigh the utility of the risk-creating conduct, then a defendant has acted
unreasonably and breached his duty of care.34
3. Causation
A plaintiff cannot prove his case for negligence without demonstrating
that the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s harm.35 A plaintiff needs
A
to establish both factual causation and proximate causation.36
defendant’s conduct is a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s harm if it was a
However, the
“substantial factor” in bringing about that harm.37
defendant’s actions are not a cause-in-fact if the plaintiff would have
suffered the harm regardless of the defendant’s actions.38
After the jury establishes that the defendant’s conduct caused the
plaintiff’s harm, it must still determine whether the defendant should be

29. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 31, at 146–49; see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra
note 18, at 87–88 (noting that juries will apply a different standard of care to, for example, a
physician and a child).
30. See DOBBS, supra note 18, § 143, at 334; see also PROSSER, supra note 20, § 43, at
250 (noting that an individual is not expected to take precautions against harms that he
cannot foresee).
31. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 32, at 150 (explaining that the reasonable person is
“[a] model of all proper qualities, with only those human shortcomings and weaknesses
which the community will tolerate on the occasion”).
32. See DOBBS, supra note 18, § 143, at 334; Cardi, supra note 28, at 745.
33. See DOBBS, supra note 18, § 144, at 337; PROSSER, supra note 20, § 32, at 148
(“Against [the] probability, and gravity, of the risk, must be balanced in every case the utility
of the type of conduct in question.”).
34. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Judge
Learned Hand proposed this analysis when he articulated that the burden of precaution must
be less than the probability multiplied by the damages (B < PL). Id. Judges do not typically
instruct juries on the Hand formula, which is used mostly by judges in determining motions
for a directed verdict or summary judgment. Instead, juries are instructed on probability and
on commensurate care, both of which are important for a cost/benefit analysis. Moreover,
oftentimes lawyers will make cost/benefit arguments before the jury in court. DOBBS, supra
note 18, § 145, at 342 n.6.
35. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 30, at 143; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 281(c) (1965).
36. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 94; see also PROSSER, supra note 20,
§ 42, at 244.
37. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 41, at 240; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 431.
38. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 95 (noting that if the plaintiff “would
have suffered the injury anyway, even if the defendant had not been careless,” no cause-infact exists).
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held responsible for that harm.39 The consequences of a person’s
unreasonable conduct are potentially limitless, and if the law held him
accountable for all of these consequences he would be subjected to
boundless liability.40 Thus, to constrain liability, courts have decided to
deny liability when “the harm that resulted from the defendant’s negligence
is so clearly outside the risks he created that it would be unjust or at least
impractical to impose liability.”41 Proximate cause represents the scope of
the defendant’s liability, and asks whether the defendant should have
foreseen the type of harm that befell the plaintiff.42 Even if the defendant
breached his duty of care by acting unreasonably and caused the plaintiff’s
injury, he can avoid liability if the consequences of his conduct were too
remote or too unusual.43 Just as the jury determines breach, the jury
considers the question of proximate cause as well.44
4. Injury
A negligence claim cannot survive if the plaintiff has not suffered an
injury.45 Unlike criminal law, tort law does not impose liability for careless
conduct if it has not harmed another individual.46 The different harms that
tort law recognizes as “injuries” include “physical harms, property
destruction, emotional distress, and economic loss.”47
B. The Details of Duty
As this Note will discuss in Part III below, courts that face take-home
asbestos cases stand divided on whether an employer or premises owner
owes a duty to third-party plaintiffs to protect them from harm.48 Even if a
39. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 41, at 244; see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra
note 18, at 103–09.
40. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at
264 (5th ed. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430.
41. See DOBBS, supra note 18, § 180, at 443.
42. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 748–49; see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18,
at 106–07.
43. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 749. A good example of this is Allison v. City of
Fredericksburg, 71 S.E. 525 (Va. 1911), in which the court held that it was unforeseeable
that after bruising her leg by stepping into a hole on a plank bridge, the plaintiff would
develop cancer that would necessitate amputation of the leg. Id. at 527. The defendant
breached its duty of care by not maintaining the bridge, but the consequences were so remote
that no proximate causation existed. Id. at 527.
44. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 45, at 321; see also PROSSER, supra note 20,
§ 41, at 240. A judge should only determine proximate cause as a matter of law if “the issue
is so clear that reasonable men could not differ.” Id.
45. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 30, at 143–44; see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra
note 18, at 72.
46. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 30, at 143–44 (“Negligent conduct in itself is not such
an interference with the interests of the world at large that there is any right to complain of it
. . . except in the case of some individual whose interests have suffered.”).
47. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 135. Courts will also sometimes
recognize an increased chance of developing an illness, or a decreased chance of survival as
a result of the defendant’s conduct, as an injury as well. Id.
48. See infra Part III.
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defendant has acted unreasonably and caused harm to the plaintiff, a court
can only hold the defendant liable for his actions if he owed a duty to the
plaintiff.49 Duty represents the only element of negligence that is a
question of law for a judge to decide, and without this element a court
cannot find negligence.50
Courts can consider a variety of different factors when determining
whether a defendant owes a duty of reasonable care to a plaintiff.51 These
factors include the “foreseeability of harm to [the plaintiff], the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant’s conduct, and the policy of preventing future
harm.”52 Some factors weigh more heavily than others in certain contexts.
For example, when the Fifth Circuit decided whether manufacturers of
asbestos owed a duty to warn users of the product’s hazards, it held that
even when the utility of the product is high enough to justify putting it on
the market, its dangerous nature compels a duty to warn.53
Another important factor that weighs heavily in courts’ determinations of
duty is the presence—or absence—of a “special relationship” between the
parties.54 Examples of “special relationships” include doctor-patient,
school-student, hotel-guest, and airline-passenger.55 In these situations, the
law has recognized that because of the nature of the relationship between
the parties, a duty should be imposed on the defendant to take reasonable
care to avoid harm to the plaintiff.56
One of the traditional distinctions that courts draw when determining
whether a duty exists is whether the defendant’s actions in relation to the
plaintiff constituted misfeasance—an affirmative act—or nonfeasance—a

49. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 56, at 340–43 (noting that a court will typically not
find an individual liable for failing to come to a person’s aid, because one ordinarily does not
have a duty to protect another from harm).
50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7 (2005); GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 77.
51. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 751–55; see also PROSSER, supra note 20, § 53, at 325–
26 (“‘[D]uty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection.”).
52. Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958).
53. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973)
(“The rationale for this rule is that the user or consumer is entitled to make his own choice as
to whether the product’s utility or benefits justify exposing himself to the risk of harm.”).
54. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 82; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1965) (noting that a duty arising from a special relationship
represents an exception to the general rule that a person does not have a duty to protect
others from harm).
55. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 82.
56. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of Macpherson, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1733, 1832–44 (1998) (“The relationship between defendant and plaintiff
actually can be used to explain why we expect defendants to take precautions against certain
kinds of harm to a plaintiff . . . .”).
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failure to act.57 Courts are more reluctant to find that a duty exists when the
defendant has not engaged in an affirmative action that harmed the plaintiff,
but has simply failed to act to prevent the plaintiff from harm.58 The reason
for this could be that “by ‘misfeasance’ the defendant has created a new risk
of harm to the plaintiff, while by ‘nonfeasance’ he has at least made his
situation no worse.”59 A court will generally only recognize a duty if it
determines that the defendant’s actions constituted a failure to warn the
plaintiff of a risk when a “special relationship” existed between the
parties.60
Foreseeability also represents a pervasive element in courts’
determinations of duty.61 In most states, courts will determine whether the
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff by asking whether the risk,
the injury, or the person injured were reasonably foreseeable.62 In the
context of asbestos litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys often present evidence
that the defendants knew asbestos was dangerous and should have foreseen
that contact with asbestos could lead to an increased chance of illness.63 As
a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that defendants have a duty to protect the
plaintiffs from exposure or, at the least, to warn them of the harm associated
with handling asbestos.64
Some scholars, as well as the Third Restatement, have criticized the
pervasiveness of foreseeability in courts’ duty analyses.65 They state that
57. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 56, at 338–39 (“In the determination of the existence
of a duty, there runs through much of the law a distinction between action and inaction.”);
see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 118–19.
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (“The fact that the actor realizes or
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.”).
59. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 56, at 339. Courts will typically not impose a duty on an
individual to rescue another person from a harm he has not created. For example, an “expert
swimmer, with a boat and a rope at hand, who sees another drowning before his eyes, is not
required to do anything at all about it, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette, and
watch the man drown.” Id. at 340.
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A; see also supra notes 54–56 and
accompanying text.
61. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 740; see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at
78 (stating that the “notion of reasonably foreseeable victims . . . is today a standard
doctrinal test for determining to whom a duty of care is owed”).
62. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate
Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1258 n.47 (2009) (citing the highest state courts of
forty-five states for the proposition that foreseeability represents a vital inquiry in their
determinations of duty).
63. See Kevin Leahy, Asbestos Exposure and the Law in the United States, in ASBESTOS
AND ITS DISEASES, supra note 8, at 346, 358 (“The notion of industry participants working
together in collusion to prevent a full realization of the known and knowable hazards of
asbestos . . . became standard fare in all jury trials.”); see also infra Part III.
64. E.g., Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006); In re N.Y.C.
Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266
S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008).
65. See Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence
Law: Descriptive Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1046 (2001) (stating
that foreseeability is “so open-ended [that it] can be used to explain any decision, even
decisions directly opposed to each other”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. j (2005) (stating that courts should
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courts use foreseeability to engage in fact-specific determinations that
should be left for the jury to examine when it considers breach and
proximate cause.66 These scholars conclude that when courts analyze
foreseeability they overstep their role by deciding questions of fact, because
whether a defendant could foresee harm to a particular plaintiff or class of
plaintiffs necessarily involves a factual inquiry.67 These fact-specific
decisions do not set a clear standard for courts to follow in future cases that
involve slightly different facts.68 Further, courts will sometimes use
concepts like foreseeability to disguise the policy decisions that inform their
opinions,69 because a holding overtly based on policy determinations treads
too closely on the territory of the legislature.70
The Third Restatement attempts to solve these perceived inadequacies by
suggesting a different standard by which courts should determine duty.71
Section 7(a) states that, “[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise
reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm,”72
thereby establishing a default duty of reasonable care when the defendant’s
conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injury.73 Thus, under the
Third Restatement’s approach, courts should not consider fact-specific
criteria, like foreseeability, because they can presume that a duty exists.74
This would leave questions of foreseeability to the jury.75
The Third Restatement, however, does not presuppose duty in every
circumstance. Section 7(b) states that, “[i]n exceptional cases, when an
articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting
leave determinations of foreseeability to the jury); Cardi, supra note 28, at 743 (noting that
foreseeability has a “schizophrenic existence” in negligence law).
66. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 774–78; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. j.
67. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 741 (noting that one of the problems with courts’ use of
foreseeability in duty is that “it operates as a vehicle by which judges decide questions
traditionally reserved for the jury”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. j.
68. See William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (1953)
(noting that the case law about reasonable foreseeability is a “rope of sand, and offers neither
certainty nor convenience”).
69. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 763 n.122 (“When judges refuse to recognize a duty in
the teeth of foreseeable harm to others, they are making an exception, on public policy
grounds, to the broad duty to avoid conduct threatening foreseeable harm to others.” (citing
Kelley, supra note 65, at 1045)); see also Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns
of Negligence, 53 LA. L. REV. 1509, 1523 (1993) (“[J]udges should not rely on, or hide
behind, words like: direct, remote, foreseeable, unforeseeable . . . and whatever other magic
mumbo jumbo courts could use to obfuscate the policies that were really at the heart of their
decisions.”).
70. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 767 (“[F]oreseeability feels safer than naked, legislativelike policy decisions.”).
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7.
72. Id. § 7(a).
73. See id. reporter’s note cmt. a.
74. Id.
75. See id. cmt. j; see also Cardi, supra note 28, at 794 (stating that if courts adopt the
Third Restatement, then foreseeability will “no longer [be] a presumed matter for the judge,
but a presumed matter for the jury”).
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liability in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant
has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires
modification.”76 This encourages courts that find no duty to state their
policy concern explicitly in order to increase transparency in their decisionmaking process.77 The provision does, however, state that courts should
only reach a finding of no duty based on policy concerns “in exceptional”
cases.78 Courts can also deny liability by deciding breach and proximate
cause as a matter of law,79 which forces courts to consider whether no
reasonable jury would have decided otherwise—a deferential standard.80
As this Note will discuss in Part III, whether a court focuses on the
relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of harm, or the
characterization of the defendants’ actions as nonfeasance often proves
determinative.81 Unlike employees, take-home asbestos plaintiffs do not
have a special relationship with either the employers or the premises
owners.82 Therefore, courts that focus on this aspect of duty often find that
there is no duty.83 Similarly, if the court characterizes the actions of the
defendants as nonfeasance because they failed to warn their employees
instead of actively maintaining an unsafe environment, it will also find that
no duty existed.84 On the other hand, as this Note will mention in Part II.A
below, many employers knew about the hazards of asbestos, and after 1972
OSHA set forth regulations that governed asbestos exposure.85 Courts
point to these facts when stating that the risk of harm to take-home asbestos
plaintiffs was foreseeable, and that employers and/or premises owners
should have taken steps to decrease this risk.86
C. The Basics of Strict Liability
Strict liability describes when an actor faces liability solely as a result of
causing harm to another individual, without an inquiry into whether he

76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 7(b).
77. See id. reporter’s note cmt. j (“[A]rticulating the policy or principle at stake will
contribute to transparency, clarity, and better understanding of tort law.”).
78. Id. § 7(b).
79. Id. § 7 cmt. i.
80. Id.
81. See infra Part III. The Supreme Court of New Jersey and the Tennessee Supreme
Court focused on foreseeability and found that a duty existed to take-home asbestos
plaintiffs. See infra Part III.A. The New York Court of Appeals, the Delaware Supreme
Court, the Michigan Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of Georgia, on the other hand,
used lack of a relationship and nonfeasance to deny that a duty existed. See infra Part III.B.
82. See infra Part III.B.1–3 (discussing the opinions of the New York Court of Appeals,
the Michigan Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of Georgia, which all stress that the
defendants owed no duty to third-party nonemployees).
83. See infra Part III.B.1–3.
84. See infra Part III.B.1, 4 (discussing the opinions of the New York Court of Appeals
and the Delaware Supreme Court).
85. See infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text.
86. See infra Part III.A.1–2 (discussing the opinions of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey and the Tennessee Supreme Court).
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behaved in a reasonable manner under the circumstances.87 Courts have
adopted this concept regarding product defects.88 Justice Roger J. Traynor
of the Supreme Court of California articulated the basis for this theory in
his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno89:
Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily either
inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public. The consumer no
longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness
of a product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his
erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers
to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as
trade-marks.90

Manufacturers stand in the best position to know the dangers of defectively
produced goods, making it their responsibility to ensure the safety of the
product when handled by consumers.91 Therefore, to bring a successful
strict product liability claim, a plaintiff must only prove that he suffered an
injury caused by the defendant’s dangerously defective product in the
normal course of using that product.92 As this Note will discuss in Part
II.B, product liability suits against the manufacturers of asbestos
experienced enormous success when the hazards of the product became
well known.93
II. HISTORY OF ASBESTOS: FROM “MAGIC MINERAL” TO “OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH DISASTER”
The magical qualities of asbestos, the mineral that refuses to burn, were
known as far back as the days of Charlemagne who supposedly amazed his
guests when he threw a tablecloth made with asbestos into the fire and
retrieved it unscathed.94 Part II.A of this Note details the history of
asbestos use and how the mineral’s positive qualities became overshadowed
by the severe health hazard it creates for anyone who regularly handles it.
Part II.B recounts the growth of asbestos litigation: what started as a
relatively small number of workers’ compensation claims soon ballooned to
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965); see also PROSSER, supra
note 20, § 75, at 494.
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (“One who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer . . . .”);
see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 284–88.
89. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
90. Id. at 443.
91. See id. When the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted this view, the theory of
strict product liability became a “national standard.” Leahy, supra note 63, at 354.
92. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 274–76; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
93. See infra notes 142–58 and accompanying text; see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY,
supra note 18, at 271 (noting that product liability suits became a “staple of tort litigation”
and were brought as a result of injuries from, among others products, “foodstuffs, vehicles,
appliances, drugs, cosmetics, tobacco, alcohol, weapons, airplanes, boats, asbestos,
construction materials, paints, fertilizers, medical devices, [and] tools”).
94. See IRVING J. SELIKOFF & DOUGLAS H. LEE, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE 5 (1978).
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hundreds of thousands of claims against companies in every industry.
Moreover, the defendants have grown more “peripheral,” moving from
asbestos manufacturers, to premises owners, to third-party product
manufacturers. Lastly, Part II.C introduces the emergence of “peripheral
plaintiffs,” individuals who were indirectly exposed to asbestos by
employees who worked around the mineral on a daily basis.
A. Overview of Asbestos
The term “asbestos” refers to several naturally occurring minerals,
including chrysotile, crocidolite, amosite, anthophyllite, tremolite, and
actinolite that exist as bundles of fibers.95 These fibers have durable and
fire resistant qualities, and can be woven together.96 Due to these
characteristics, companies mined asbestos extensively and used it in a
variety of different industries.97 The building and construction industries
used it pervasively for insulation, fireproofing, roofing, and sound
absorption.98 The shipbuilding industry used asbestos to insulate boilers,
steam pipes and hot water pipes.99 The automobile industry used it in
vehicle brake shoes and clutch pads.100
Although asbestos has extremely useful properties, researchers
discovered that the minerals posed serious health hazards.101 Reports of a
link between asbestos and lung cancer appeared as early as the 1930s.102
Scientists in England studied individuals who worked in asbestos mines and
discovered that they had a high risk of developing lung cancer as a result of
95. See See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2642(3) (2006); Standards for
Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(b) (2011).
96. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 13; see also Christopher J. O’Malley, Note,
Breaking Asbestos Litigation’s Chokehold on the American Judiciary, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1101, 1101–02 (citing RACHEL MAINES, ASBESTOS AND FIRE: TECHNOLOGICAL TRADE-OFFS
AND THE BODY AT RISK 19 (2005) (stating that the lowest fire death rate in the United States
occurred simultaneously with the use of 1.5 billion pounds of asbestos)).
97. See Fact Sheet: Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4; see also
SELIKOFF & LEE, supra note 94, at 16–20 (noting that some asbestos products included
asbestos yarn, cloth, tape, paper, pipes, and insulation).
98. See Fact Sheet: Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4; see also
Craighead, supra note 9, at 51–54.
99. See Fact Sheet: Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4. The United
States government commissioned the use of asbestos to fireproof ships during World War II.
During that time, 4.5 million Americans were employed in shipyards and exposed to the risk
of asbestos inhalation. Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Lessons: The Consequences of Asbestos
Litigation, 26 REV. LITIG. 583, 586–87 (2007).
100. See Fact Sheet: Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4; see also
Craighead, supra note 9, at 63–68.
101. See BARRY L. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 5–9 (5th ed.
2005); SELIKOFF & LEE, supra note 94, at 20–30.
102. See Richard Doll, Mortality from Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers, 12 BRIT. J.
INDUS. MED. 81, 81 (1955) (noting that in 1935, British scientists Kenneth Lynch and Atmar
Smith published the first case report of a patient who developed lung cancer as a result of
asbestos exposure). Well before these epidemiological studies surfaced, the Ancient
Romans in the first century also recognized the health hazards associated with asbestos.
Pliny the Elder even suggested that slaves who handled asbestos should use transparent
bladder skins as respirators to prevent asbestos fiber inhalation. Ira Pilchen, Asbestos, “The
Magic Mineral,” Creates Toxic Tort “Avalanche,” 75 JUDICATURE 320 (1992).
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their exposure to asbestos, with the risk increasing in proportion to the
length of employment.103 In the United States, Dr. Irving Selikoff
conducted the first groundbreaking work on asbestos-related diseases while
at the Mt. Sinai School of Medicine in New York in 1964.104 Like the
British studies, this study also found a causal connection between asbestos
exposure and an increased risk of cancer.105 When Congress eventually
passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act106 in 1970 and created
OSHA, the agency quickly sought to regulate asbestos.107
In 1972, OSHA set forth a series of strict guidelines for controlling
asbestos exposure in the workplace.108 These regulations established a
permissible exposure limit, as well as requirements for providing
employees with respiratory equipment while handling asbestos, special
clothing for use during the workday, changing rooms, and laundry facilities
in order to isolate the asbestos-containing clothing.109 As evidence of
asbestos’s harmful effects mounted, the Environmental Protection Agency
proposed banning all products containing asbestos.110 Although the
proposal was set aside,111 some products containing asbestos were
banned.112
Ten years after the proposed ban, one journalist called asbestos “the
worst occupational health disaster in U.S. history.”113 Researchers have
estimated that from 1985 to 2009, more than 225,000 deaths would occur as
103. See Doll, supra note 102, at 86; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 42–44.
104. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 14. Although significant research on asbestos
exposure was not conducted in the United States until the 1960s, evidence exists that the
asbestos industry knew about the dangers of the product since the 1930s. Records from
companies like Johns-Manville indicate that corporate officials concealed the risks of
asbestos exposure from their workers. See Hensler, supra note 10, at 258.
105. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 14.
106. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2006))
(“The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy . . . to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions . . . .”).
107. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 13; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at
269 (“The asbestos industry knew [asbestos] would be one of the first regulatory targets of
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).”).
108. See Standards for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (2011).
109. See id. The 1972 regulations demonstrated an effort to warn and protect not only the
employees, but also those who may come into contact with asbestos carried on the
employees’ person from harm. See id.
110. See Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce
Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,467 (July 12, 1989) (“EPA has concluded that the
continued manufacture, importation, and processing of the asbestos-containing products that
are identified in the rule poses an unreasonable risk of injury to human health.”).
111. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. E.P.A., 947 F.2d 1201, 1229–30 (5th Cir. 1991); see
also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 454.
112. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 13. It is important to note that asbestos is only
harmful once it is disturbed. When disturbed, inhalation of its fibers can be lethal. Fact
Sheet: Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4.
113. Dennis Cauchon, “Nobody Can Plead Ignorance”: At Least 1 Million Likely To Die
Over 30 Years in Poor Nations, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 1999, at 4A. Others, however, point
out asbestos’s lifesaving properties. Because of its fire-resistant qualities “[i]t is not unlikely
that tens or even hundreds of thousands of Americans were spared a scorching death because
of the use of asbestos.” Carrington, supra note 99, at 587.
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a result of asbestos exposure from 1940 to 1979.114 One of the most salient
points about asbestos-related diseases is that they have a very long latency
period; symptoms can surface more than fifteen years after an individual’s
first exposure.115 As a result, many people will not show symptoms until
decades after they have already left their places of employment.116
Doctors have linked several different cancers to asbestos exposure.117
Mesothelioma represents the most severe of the asbestos-related cancers
and affects the lining of the chest or abdomen.118 Asbestos exposure is the
only cause of mesothelioma, and the disease is always fatal, with death
occurring from several months to a year or two after diagnosis.119 An
individual does not need exposure to high levels of asbestos to contract
mesothelioma.120 Asbestos exposure can also cause various other cancers,
such as lung cancer.121 Mesothelioma and lung cancer represent the two
most common malignant diseases related to asbestos exposure.122
However, smoking and other factors can also cause lung cancer, which can
complicate the analysis of causation in asbestos cases.123
Asbestos exposure also causes various nonmalignant diseases of the
lungs.124 Asbestosis results in a scarring of the lung tissue that occurs when
an individual inhales asbestos fibers and they become lodged in the
lungs.125 Asbestosis is usually not fatal and is often not debilitating.126 The
severity of the disease increases with the level of exposure and can range
114. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 16.
115. See Asbestos: Health Facts, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY
(Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/asbestos/asbestos/health_effects/index.html; see
also David Weill, Diagnostic Features and Clinical Evaluation of the Asbestos-Associated
Diseases, in ASBESTOS AND ITS DISEASES, supra note 8, at 253, 254.
116. See Asbestos: Health Facts, supra note 115; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101,
at 196.
117. See Asbestos: Health Facts, supra note 115 (noting that factors that impact the
development of disease include exposure concentration, duration, and frequency, as well as
the chemical composition of the specific asbestos fibers).
118. See id.; see also CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 17; SELIKOFF & LEE, supra note
94, at 243–44.
119. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 17; see also Harvey I. Pass et al., Therapeutic
Approaches to Malignant Mesothelioma, in ASBESTOS AND ITS DISEASES, supra note 8, at
326, 326–27.
120. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 17; CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 429 (noting
that “levels of exposure insufficient to produce asbestosis can nonetheless cause cancer”).
121. See Fact Sheet: Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4 (stating that some
studies suggest that asbestos exposure can increase risks for gastrointestinal and colorectal
cancers, as well as cancers of the throat, kidneys, esophagus, and gallbladder); see also
Richard Attanoos, Lung Cancer Associated with Asbestos Exposure, in ASBESTOS AND ITS
DISEASES, supra note 8, at 172, 172–86.
122. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 17.
123. See id. (noting that because of the high rate of smoking in blue-collar industries
where workers were exposed to asbestos, defendants often try to associate the plaintiffs’ lung
cancer with smoking rather than asbestos exposure); see also Attanoos, supra note 121, at
174.
124. See Fact Sheet: Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4.
125. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 17; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 9–
10.
126. John E. Craighead, Benign Pleural and Parenchymal Diseases Associated with
Asbestos Exposure, in ASBESTOS AND ITS DISEASES, supra note 8, at 139, 145–46.
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from debilitating to only mildly impairing.127 Other results of asbestos
exposure include pleural thickening—a scarring of the membrane that
surrounds the lungs—and pleural effusions, collections of fluid between
layers of tissue lining the lungs or chest cavity.128 As employees began to
develop symptoms of these diseases, thousands of claims poured into state
and federal courts across the country.129
B. An “Elephantine Mass” of Asbestos Litigation
The history of asbestos has been described as “a tale of danger known in
the 1930s, exposure inflicted upon millions of Americans in the 1940s and
1950s, injuries that began to take their toll in the 1960s, and a flood of
lawsuits beginning in the 1970s.”130 As discussed, the latency period for
asbestos-related diseases could last as long as thirty or forty years, and
therefore, employees did not bring claims until decades after their initial
exposures.131 But when they did bring suit, employees first turned to the
remedy of workers’ compensation.132 With epidemiological studies as
evidence, employees sought to recover lost wages and medical costs
resulting from asbestos-related diseases.133
Many of these claims proved unsuccessful, however, because workers’
compensation administrators often stated that the nexus between the
employee’s disease and the asbestos exposure that occurred decades ago
was too tenuous, or that the statute of limitations for bringing claims had
passed.134 The employees that did get compensation typically received
only a fraction of their lost wages and no damages for pain and suffering.135
Moreover, the workers’ compensation system did not provide a strong
incentive for employers to stop utilizing asbestos.136
When workers’ compensation statutes proved unsatisfactory, employees
turned to tort law and began to file claims against asbestos manufacturers
for negligence and strict products liability.137 Some states, however,
127. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 17.
128. See id.; see also Fact Sheet: Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4.
129. See GRIFFIN B. BELL, ASBESTOS LITIGATION AND JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP: THE
COURTS’ DUTY TO HELP SOLVE THE ASBESTOS LITIGATION CRISIS 2–3 (2002) (noting that
20,000 cases were pending since 1984).
130. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2–3 (1991).
131. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
132. See Hensler, supra note 10, at 259; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 143–45.
133. See Hensler, supra note 10, at 259.
134. See id. at 259–60; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 170 (stating that workers’
compensation claims “appear to have been bitterly contested, with payments delayed through
every legal means”).
135. See Leahy, supra note 63, at 350 (noting that workers often received only half to
two-thirds of lost wages); see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 197 (stating that, when
exposure occurred a long time ago, compensation awards could be “pitifully small”).
136. See Leahy, supra note 63, at 350 (noting that the small amount that employers had to
compensate their employees did not prove to be a successful deterrent).
137. See CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 197–98 (noting that because of the difficulty of
getting adequate workers’ compensation “it is not surprising” that workers began to file civil
suits against asbestos manufacturers); see also Rebecca Leah Levine, Clearing the Air:
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prevented plaintiffs from bringing claims because their exposure occurred
many years before, and the statute of limitations had already run138: the
permissible time to bring a claim began with the first instance of exposure,
and had therefore expired.139 State legislatures realized that because of the
long latency period, plaintiffs could not be expected to file claims before
noticing that they were sick.140 Legislatures therefore changed the statute
of limitations to require plaintiffs to file claims within a year or two after
they knew, or should have known, of their injury.141
The first significant success for plaintiffs occurred in 1973 when the
court in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.142 held that
manufacturers of asbestos-containing products could be strictly liable for
injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos.143 The decision in Borel gave
employees the confidence to begin to bring more product liability
lawsuits.144 Moreover, as a result of the asbestos standards that OSHA set
in 1972, plaintiffs’ attorneys could argue that asbestos manufacturers did
not attempt to regulate levels of exposure, further bolstering their claims.145
Plaintiffs found increased success after legislatures adjusted the typical
requirements of proving causation to account for the long latency period for
asbestos-related diseases.146 In a product liability case, plaintiffs must
usually prove that the defendant’s product caused them harm.147 In the case
of asbestos exposure, however, plaintiffs must prove that the defendant’s
product represented a substantial factor in bringing about their disease and
that the product was at the site and in the proximity of where the plaintiff
Often plaintiffs meet this burden of proof through
worked.148
circumstantial evidence.149 In other contexts, plaintiffs can name the
Ordinary Negligence in Take-Home Asbestos Exposure Litigation, 86 WASH. L. REV. 359,
370 (2011). Employees could not bring separate claims against their employers under
common law tort liability for injuries relating to asbestos exposure when there existed an
applicable workers’ compensation law. Daniel J. Penofsky, Annotation, Asbestos Injury
Litigation, 60 AM. JUR. Trials § 39 (1996).
138. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 22.
139. See id; see also Joel E. Smith, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to
Run as to Cause of Action for Development of Latent Industrial or Occupational Disease, 1
A.L.R. 4TH 117 (1980) (“[W]here an injury . . . is sustained in consequence of the wrongful
act of another, the statute of limitations attaches at once, and the running of the statute is not
postponed by the fact that the actual or substantial damages do not occur until a later date.”).
140. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 22–23.
141. See id.
142. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
143. See id. at 1081; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 319 (calling the case
“precedent setting”).
144. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 2; Hensler, supra note 10, at 260 (“Borel
opened the doors to the courthouse for workers who had been injured by exposure to
asbestos.”).
145. See Leahy, supra note 63, at 357 (“Plaintiffs could now rely on the OSHA standards
as a measure of reasonable conduct.”).
146. See Christopher W. Jackson, Note, Taking Duty Home: Why Asbestos Litigation
Reform Should Give Courts the Confidence to Recognize A Duty to Second-Hand Exposure
Victims, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1162–63 (2010).
147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
148. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 72 (2011).
149. See id.
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products that they handled, but in asbestos suits plaintiffs often cannot
remember the names of products they worked with thirty or forty years
ago.150 Therefore, some courts now allow testimony from co-workers
stating that other employees used the defendant’s asbestos-containing
products at the worksite at the same time that the plaintiff worked there.151
Others require that the plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant’s product
was used frequently at the worksite, and that the plaintiff regularly worked
in its proximity.152 The long latency period unique to asbestos-related
diseases has thus resulted in certain accommodations for proving
causation.153
The growth of asbestos litigation put a large strain on asbestos
manufacturers.154 By 1982, for example, plaintiffs filed 6,000 cases a year
against Johns-Manville,155 and at the end of that year the asbestosproducing giant had filed for bankruptcy.156 As claims flooded the courts,
more and more corporations were forced into bankruptcy.157 Researchers
have estimated that by 2002, more than seventy-five companies declared
bankruptcy as a result of asbestos litigation, and asbestos plaintiffs received
more than $70 billion.158
As asbestos manufacturers went bankrupt, plaintiffs “cast their litigation
net wider” and turned to more “peripheral” defendants.159 Many plaintiffs
150. See id. (“A plaintiff injured by asbestos fibers often does not know exactly when or
where he or she was injured and therefore is unable to describe the details of how such injury
occurred.”).
151. E.g., Lane v. Celotex Corp., 782 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[R]ecovery will
require the plaintiff to show that he was exposed to defendant’s asbestos-containing product
by working with or in close proximity to the product.” (quoting Blackston v. Shook &
Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480, 1481 (11th Cir. 1985))).
152. E.g., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162–63 (4th Cir.
1986) (“To support a reasonable inference of substantial causation from circumstantial
evidence, there must be evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over
some extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked.”).
153. For a critique of what he deems the loosening of traditional elements of tort law, see
BELL, supra note 129, at 11, which states that plaintiffs will “invariably identify the product
of solvent companies that have available funds to pay inventory settlements” and that such a
system “rarely accommodates a determination of whether plaintiffs made valid product
identification.”
154. See Hensler, supra note 10, at 261 (noting that the filing of claims quickly increased
in states that contained industries like shipbuilding, which had a high risk of asbestos
exposure); see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 198.
155. See Leahy, supra note 63, at 361.
156. See id.; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 199. Many in the industry felt
shocked by the bankruptcy of Johns-Manville, which had advertised itself as the “largest
producer of asbestos-based products in the United States.” Leahy, supra note 63, at 361 n.19.
157. See Anita Bernstein, Asbestos Achievements, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 691, 691 (2008); see
also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 201.
158. See Bernstein, supra note 157, at 691.
159. See Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: The Tide
Appears to Be Turning, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 477, 484–85 (2006) (quoting Editorial, Lawyers
Torch the Economy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2001, at A14); Susan Warren, Asbestos Quagmire:
Plaintiffs Target Companies Whose Premises Contained Any Form of Deadly Material,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at B1; see also CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 31 (“Plaintiff
attorneys sought out new defendants and pressed defendants that they had heretofore treated
as peripheral to the litigation for more money.”).
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filed claims against premises owners claiming that they behaved negligently
in failing to exercise reasonable care to protect the plaintiffs from asbestosrelated harm.160 In a typical claim against a premises owner, an employee
of an independent contractor hired by the owner will bring suit.161 Because
the employees are invitees, or “business visitors” of the premises owner, the
premises owner can be liable for harms that the employees suffer if it knew,
or should have known, of the defective condition on its premises.162
Although plaintiffs initially limited their claims to asbestos
manufacturers, more recently they have targeted much more numerous and
varied companies.163 Researchers estimate that, as of 2002, over 6,000
different companies spanning “the full range of American business” have
been named as defendants in asbestos personal injury suits.164
Along with premises owners, other “peripheral defendants” now include
third-party product manufacturers, who produced parts that other parties
later insulated with asbestos.165 For example, plaintiffs bring these types of
claims against the manufacturers of pipes or valves that the purchasers
would insulate with asbestos in order to improve functioning.166 Courts
have approached these cases by asking whether the manufacturers had a
duty to prevent the plaintiffs from asbestos-related harms when the
manufacturers did not themselves use asbestos with their products.167
Those courts that determine a duty existed find that the manufacturers often
knew, or should have known, that their products would be used in
conjunction with asbestos.168 Thus, the defendants should have foreseen
that the people who ultimately handled their products would become
exposed to the hazards of asbestos.169 Most courts, however, have rejected
160. See, e.g., In re All Me. Asbestos Litig., 581 F. Supp. 963, 977 (D. Me. 1984); see
also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 751.
161. See Kenneth R. Meyer et al., Emerging Trends in Asbestos Premises Liability
Claims: Understanding Current Theories of Liability and Proposed Legislation to Protect
Your Client, 72 DEF. COUNS. J. 241, 242 (2005).
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 332, 343 (1965). In some situations courts
will state that the premises owner did not retain any control over the work of the independent
contractor and therefore should not be held liable. E.g., Purcell v. Varian Med. Sys., Inc.,
No. A100725, 2004 WL 639852, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2004).
163. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 49; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at
745 (noting that by 2004 asbestos litigation “involved thousands of corporate defendants”
ranging from manufacturers to premises owners and insurers).
164. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 49.
165. See Paul J. Riehle et al., Products Liability for Third Party Replacement or
Connected Parts: Changing Tides from the West, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 33, 38 (2009); see also
Beth M. Kramer et al., Recent Developments in Toxic Torts and Environmental Law, 46
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 635, 638–39 (2011).
166. E.g., Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 198 P.3d 493, 495 (Wash. 2008).
167. See id.; see also O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987 (Cal. 2012).
168. See Sawyer v. A.C. & S., Inc., No. 111152/99, 2011 WL 3764074, at *2 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. June 24, 2011) (“[A] manufacturer’s liability for third-party component parts must be
determined by the degree to which injury from the component parts is foreseeable to the
manufacturer.”); see also Chicano v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. Civ.A. 03-5126, 2004 WL
2250990, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2004) (stating that there is “at least a genuine issue of
material fact” as to whether the defendant could foresee that its product would be used with
asbestos-containing insulation).
169. See Sawyer, 2011 WL 3764074, at *3.
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these types of suits, holding that a manufacturer of a component part is not
responsible for what is added to its product in the stream of commerce.170
Although these types of claims have not met with great success,171 they
nevertheless represent the widening of claims to more and more peripheral
parties.
Faced with what the Supreme Court characterized as an “asbestoslitigation crisis,”172 Congress has tried numerous times to pass asbestos
reforms. In 1990, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist appointed the U.S.
Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation to examine
the effects of the crisis.173 A report published by the Committee in 1991
concluded that “the situation has reached critical dimensions and is getting
worse. What has been a frustrating problem is becoming a disaster of major
proportions . . . which the courts are ill-equipped to meet effectively.”174
Notwithstanding the Committee’s call for Congressional action, attempts to
pass legislation addressing the mass of asbestos claims have failed.175 In
2005, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved the Fairness in Asbestos
Injury Resolution Act,176 which would have established a $140 billion
National Asbestos Trust Fund comprised of money from different bankrupt
estates, as well as from companies that currently face asbestos liability.177
The bill, however, never passed the Senate.178
C. The “Specter of Limitless Liability”: Take-Home Asbestos Cases
The new frontier for asbestos litigation has seen the emergence of takehome asbestos cases.179 Alternatively referred to as “secondary” or
“bystander” exposure cases, these claims are typically brought by members
of the employee’s household who become exposed to asbestos through
contact with the employee’s work clothes or with the employee’s person.180
170. See O’Neil, 266 P.3d at 996; see also Braaten, 198 P.3d at 498 (stating that its
decision is “in accord with the majority rule nationwide: a manufacturer’s duty to warn is
restricted to warnings based on the characteristics of the manufacturer’s own products”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
171. See Braaten, 198 P.3d at 498.
172. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
173. See BELL, supra note 129, at 3.
174. See id. (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS
LITIG., supra note 130, at 2 (1991)). Some of the specific problems that the Committee
pointed to include long delays, the same issues being relitigated, high transaction costs, and
the possibility that future claimants may not be able to recover as a result of the diminishing
of assets. Id. at 3.
175. See Lester Brickman, An Analysis of the Financial Impact of S. 852: The Fairness
in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1003–06 (2005).
176. S. 852, 109th Cong. (2005).
177. See Carrington, supra note 99, at 596.
178. See id.
179. See Behrens & Cruz-Alvarez, supra note 11, at 1. Behrens and Cruz-Alvarez note
the evolution of asbestos litigation. In the beginning, it involved plaintiffs suing asbestos
products manufacturers. Id. Then, plaintiffs would bring claims against “peripheral
defendants” like premises owners because the manufacturers had filed for bankruptcy. Id.
Now, the litigation has moved to “peripheral plaintiffs” who seek to hold premises owners
liable for secondary exposure. Id.
180. See Behrens, supra note 14, at 545–46.
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Take-home exposure plaintiffs bring claims against, among other
defendants, the employers, and often the premises owners, particularly in
cases where the employee worked for an independent contractor.181 The
central issue in these cases is whether the defendant owed a duty to the
plaintiff to prevent him from the harm associated with asbestos exposure.182
Although employees typically cannot bring a claim against their
employers because of workers’ compensation statutes, take-home asbestos
plaintiffs do not face this restriction.183 As will be discussed in greater
detail in Part III, these plaintiffs often assert that the employer breached its
duty of care by failing to warn its employees of the dangers of asbestos
exposure or was negligent in failing to maintain a safe working
environment.184 Courts wrestling with the issue of whether to apply a duty
of care have utilized many of the factors discussed in Part I.B above, such
as foreseeability, the nature of the relationship between the parties, and
whether the defendants’ actions constituted misfeasance or nonfeasance.185
The history of asbestos litigation has also informed the courts decisions,
and the policy implications of their holdings often play a role in duty
determinations.186
III. STATE SPLIT ON WHETHER EMPLOYERS OWE A DUTY TO
FAMILY MEMBERS INJURED BY TAKE-HOME ASBESTOS
Part III details the conflict between state courts that determine that
employer and landowner defendants owe a duty to third-party plaintiffs to
protect them from asbestos-related injuries, and state courts that hold that
the defendants owe no duty to third-party plaintiffs.
A. States That Find Employers Owe a Duty
Part III.A. of this Note examines the opinions of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey and the Tennessee Supreme Court, which both held that
landowners and employers owe a duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs to
protect them from asbestos-related injuries. In determining that a duty
existed, both courts relied heavily on the foreseeability of the harm to the
plaintiff.

181. See “Take-Home” Exposure Claims on the Rise, 39 Prod. Safety & Liability Rep.
(BNA) 1229 (Nov. 7, 2011).
182. See id.
183. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text.
184. E.g., Price v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. 26 A.3d 162 (Del. 2011); CSX Transp.,
Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. 2005); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115
(N.Y. 2005); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008).
185. See Price, 26 A.3d 162; CSX Transp., Inc., 608 S.E.2d 208; In re Certified Question
from the Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 2007); Olivo v. OwensIllinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115;
Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d 347.
186. See Price, 26 A.3d 162; CSX Transp., Inc., 608 S.E.2d 208; In re Certified Question,
740 N.W.2d 206; Olivo, 895 A.2d 1143; In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115;
Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d 347.
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1. New Jersey: Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.
In Olivo v. Owens-Illinois,187 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
examined the duty of a landowner to spouses handling workers’ asbestoscovered clothing.188 The plaintiff, Anthony Olivo, worked as a steamfitter
and welder for thirty-seven years between 1947 and 1984.189 Independent
contractors hired him to work at different sites in New Jersey, including
defendant Exxon Mobil’s refinery.190 During the course of his duties, Mr.
Olivo routinely worked with asbestos-containing products such as pipe
covering and gaskets.191 When Mr. Olivo came home each evening, he
removed his asbestos-laden clothes, and left them for his wife, Eleanor
Olivo, to wash.192 Doctors eventually diagnosed Mr. Olivo with a nonmalignant asbestos-related disease, while Mrs. Olivo was diagnosed with
mesothelioma and died a year later.193
Mr. Olivo, who brought suit on his wife’s behalf, alleged that Exxon
Mobil breached its duty to maintain a safe working environment by failing
to protect him and Mrs. Olivo from asbestos exposure.194 In turn, Exxon
Mobil filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that it owed no duty
to Mrs. Olivo because she did not sustain injuries on its premises.195 The
trial court agreed with Exxon Mobil and granted the motion, stating that it
would not be “fair or just”196 to impose a duty on a landowner to prevent
injuries that occurred off premises.197 The Appellate Division reversed,
holding that Exxon Mobil should have foreseen harm to Mrs. Olivo and that
it stood in the best position to prevent the harm because the company could
have warned the workers or provided changing facilities to minimize the
risk of exposure.198
In affirming the Appellate Division’s decision, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey engaged in a two-step analysis to determine whether Exxon
Mobil owed a duty of reasonable care to Mrs. Olivo.199 First, the court
determined that the defendant should have foreseen the risk of harm to an
individual like Mrs. Olivo.200 The court relied on a 1937 report for the
petroleum industry, as well as hygiene texts dating back to 1916, to
determine that Exxon Mobil knew of the dangers associated with prolonged
asbestos exposure.201 Moreover, the court stated that it “requires no leap of
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006).
See id. at 1146.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1146–47.
Id. at 1147.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1148–49.
Id. at 1149.
Id.
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imagination” to recognize that during the course of his employment either
Mr. Olivo or his spouse would have to launder his clothing and would
therefore come into contact with asbestos.202 Therefore, the court held that
Exxon could foresee the risk of asbestos exposure to a person like Mrs.
Olivo.
Second, the court applied a balancing analysis: it examined “the
relationship between the parties, the nature of the risk and how relatively
easy it would have been to provide warnings,” and determined that these
factors weighed in favor of imposing a duty on Exxon Mobil.203 The court
responded to Exxon Mobil’s fear that using a foreseeability analysis would
lead to limitless liability, stating that the holding applied specifically to the
foreseeable harm that Mrs. Olivo experienced.204 Accordingly, the court’s
duty analysis did not extend to every third party injured by take-home
asbestos.205 Foreseeability, however, did play a crucial role in New
Jersey’s determination of duty in cases of secondhand asbestos exposure.206
2. Tennessee: Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co.
Like the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Olivo, Tennessee’s highest
court also held that a duty existed to protect those who came into regular
contact with asbestos-containing clothes from harm.207
For eight years plaintiff Doug Satterfield worked at defendant Alcoa,
Inc., an international manufacturer of aluminum and aluminum products.208
Many of the materials used by Alcoa contained asbestos, and as a result Mr.
Satterfield routinely came into contact with asbestos dust.209 During his
employment at Alcoa, Mr. Satterfield and his wife had a daughter, Amanda
Nicole Satterfield.210 Amanda Satterfield spent the first three months of her
life hospitalized because she was premature, and Mr. Satterfield visited her
every day, going directly from work to the hospital.211 As a result, Amanda
regularly came in contact with asbestos dust from her father’s work clothes,
and at the age of twenty-five was diagnosed with mesothelioma, passing
away shortly afterward.212
Before her death, Amanda Satterfield alleged that Alcoa negligently
allowed her father to wear his asbestos-containing clothes home, thus

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1150. But see In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 119 (N.Y. 2005)
(stating that imposing a duty unleashes a “specter of limitless liability” (quoting Hamilton v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 223 (2001))).
205. Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1150.
206. Id.
207. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tenn. 2008).
208. Id. at 352–53.
209. Id. at 353.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 351–54. Amanda Satterfield had originally filed a complaint against Alcoa,
but after she died the trial court substituted her father Doug Satterfield as the representative
of her estate.
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repeatedly exposing her to asbestos fibers.213 In response, Alcoa filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that it owed no duty to Ms.
Satterfield.214 The trial court granted the motion, but the Tennessee Court
of Appeals reversed.215
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Alcoa owed a duty
to those individuals who regularly came into contact with its employees’
asbestos-containing clothing.216
The court began its analysis by
emphasizing that Alcoa’s actions constituted misfeasance, not
nonfeasance.217 While individuals have a duty to refrain from affirmatively
causing others harm, they generally do not have a duty to protect others
from harm.218 Tennessee has espoused this rule, with the exception that
when the parties have a special relationship, there exists a duty to protect
the endangered party.219
The court rejected Alcoa’s argument that because its act consisted of a
failure to warn, and no special relationship existed between the company
and Amanda Satterfield, it therefore owed no duty to her.220 The court held
that, in determining if an action constitutes misfeasance or nonfeasance, a
court must consider whether the individual’s entire conduct created an
increased risk of harm, and not simply whether a specific act constituted a
negligent omission.221 The court therefore characterized Alcoa’s actions as
misfeasance, because “operating its facility in such an unsafe manner that
dangerous asbestos fibers were transmitted outside the facility” constituted
an affirmative act that created a risk of injury.222 When an individual
engages in an injurious affirmative act, he has a duty to those injured by the
act, no matter what the relationship is between the parties.223 Accordingly,
because Alcoa engaged in affirmative acts of misfeasance, the court did not
need to consider the relationship between it and Ms. Satterfield.224
Although the analysis of misfeasance did not require an inquiry into the
relationship of the parties, it did require the court to engage in a balancing
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 351.
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 355–56; see supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 359.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 356–57 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 reporter’s note cmt. c (Tentative Draft 2005) (“For example, a
failure to employ an automobile’s brakes or a failure to warn about a latent danger in one’s
product is not a case of nonfeasance . . . because in those cases the entirety of the actor’s
conduct (driving an automobile or selling a product) created a risk of harm.”)).
222. Id. at 364.
223. See id. at 363.
224. Id. at 363–64. The court adopted the Third Restatement’s view that parties do not
have to be in privity to establish negligence, stating that “[e]ven when the actor and victim
are complete strangers and have no relationship, the basis for the ordinary duty of reasonable
care . . . is conduct that creates a risk to another.” Id. at 362 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 reporter’s note cmt. c
(Tentative Draft 2005)).
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test before imposing a duty.225 Similar to the factors outlined by the New
Jersey court, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that a duty exists when
“the degree of foreseeability of the risk and the gravity of the harm
outweigh the burden that would be imposed if the defendant were required
to engage in an alternative course of conduct that would have prevented the
harm.”226 The court noted that foreseeability plays a significant role in this
analysis.227 A duty exists when the harm from a course of conduct is
foreseeable enough that a reasonable person would refrain from engaging in
it.228
Applying the balancing factors to Amanda Satterfield’s case, the court
concluded that Alcoa knew the danger that asbestos posed and that it should
have foreseen the harm that an individual, like Ms. Satterfield, could
suffer.229 Moreover, Alcoa could have easily reduced the harm by, among
other things, providing basic warnings about asbestos, offering laundry
services to its employees, and encouraging employees to use on-site
showers.230 Therefore, the court determined that Alcoa owed a duty of
reasonable care to individuals like Ms. Satterfield.231
Unlike the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Tennessee’s highest court did
not limit this duty to the individual plaintiff.232 Instead, it determined that
such a duty “extends to those who regularly and repeatedly come into close
contact with an employee’s contaminated work clothes over an extended
period of time, regardless of whether they live in the employee’s home or
are a family member.”233 The court reasoned that because Alcoa created a
foreseeable risk to such individuals, and did nothing to minimize this risk,
Alcoa’s duty should extend beyond those in the immediate family of the
employee.234 Rejecting Alcoa’s argument that such a finding would
contribute to the “asbestos litigation crisis,” the court noted that Ms.
Satterfield, who died of mesothelioma, represents the type of plaintiff
whose claims courts should encourage.235 Moreover, if the financial burden
does not fall upon actors like Alcoa, it will fall upon the victims themselves,
a result the court does not support.236
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Janice M. Holder stated
that the majority should not have relied on foreseeability in its
determination of duty.237 Justice Holder argued that courts should instead
225. Id. at 364–65.
226. Id. at 365. See Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1147–49 (N.J. 2006).
227. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 366. But see id. at 375–78 (Holder, J., concurring and
dissenting) (arguing that courts should not determine foreseeability at the duty stage, and that
juries should instead consider foreseeability when deciding breach and proximate cause).
228. Id. at 366–67 (majority opinion).
229. Id. at 367.
230. Id. at 368.
231. Id. at 369.
232. Id. at 374.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 370.
236. Id. at 371.
237. See id. at 375 (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting).
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leave foreseeability for juries to consider when deciding breach and
proximate cause.238 She expressed a concern that, “[b]y incorporating
foreseeability into an analysis of duty, the majority transforms a factual
question into a legal issue and expands the authority of judges at the
expense of juries.”239 Thus, whether a defendant could foresee harm to the
plaintiff plays a role in establishing whether the defendant’s actions were
reasonable, which represents a determination of breach.240
Justice Holder would have adopted the Third Restatement’s approach and
hold that whenever a defendant’s conduct creates a risk of harm to the
plaintiff, a duty of reasonable care arises.241 Only under certain specific
circumstances, such as when countervailing policy considerations exist,
should courts determine that the defendant owes no duty to the injured
plaintiff.242 For example, Tennessee has held that property owners do not
owe a duty to prevent a contractor from harm caused by a defect that the
contractor has undertaken to repair.243 Justice Holder noted that while
foreseeability represents a “notoriously malleable and indefinite
concept,”244 the Third Restatement offers a clearer approach.245 When a
plaintiff asserts that the defendant’s conduct harmed him, as the plaintiff
did in this case, courts should presume a duty exists unless specific policy
considerations weigh in favor of finding no duty.246
B. States That Decline to Impose a Duty
Part III.B of this Note examines the opinions of the New York Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Michigan Supreme Court, and
the Delaware Supreme Court, which all determined that employees and
premises owners do not owe a duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs. In
their decisions to deny duty, these courts focused on the lack of a
relationship between the parties, the characterization of the defendants’ acts
as nonfeasance, and the policy of limiting already massive asbestos
litigation.

238. Id. at 376.
239. Id. (“A collection of twelve people representing a cross-section of the public is better
suited than any judge to make the common-sense and experience-based judgment of
foreseeability.”).
240. Id. at 377.
241. Id. at 377 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 (2005) (“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care
when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”)); see supra notes 71–73 and
accompanying text.
242. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 378; see supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
243. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 378 (citing Blair v. Campbell, 924 S.W.2d 75, 76–78
(Tenn. 1996)).
244. Id. (“[T]here are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee forever.” (citing
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989))).
245. Id.
246. Id.
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1. New York: In re New York City Asbestos Litigation
In In re New York City Asbestos Litigation,247 the New York Court of
Appeals held that an employer does not owe a duty to third parties to
protect them from harm caused by asbestos exposure.248 The plaintiff, John
Holdampf, worked for the defendant, the Port Authority, between 1960 and
1996, doing various jobs that required him to handle asbestos-containing
products.249 Mr. Holdampf’s wife, Elizabeth, was exposed to the asbestos
dust when she washed her husband’s uniforms.250 Doctors diagnosed Mrs.
Holdampf with mesothelioma in 2001.251
Mr. and Mrs. Holdampf alleged that the Port Authority acted negligently
in failing to warn its employees of the dangers of asbestos to themselves
and to those who could foreseeably come into contact with asbestoscontaining materials.252 The Port Authority moved for summary judgment,
stating that it owed no duty to Mrs. Holdampf, as she did not work for the
Port Authority.253 The New York State Supreme Court granted the motion,
stating that the Port Authority did not owe Mrs. Holdampf a duty to prevent
her from harms associated with asbestos exposure.254 The court based its
decision on Widera v. Ettco Wire & Cable Corp.,255 in which the Appellate
Division held that an employer did not owe a duty to the plaintiff to prevent
harm caused by in utero exposure to chemicals that a father brought home
on his work clothes.256
The Appellate Division, however, modified the Supreme Court’s order,
distinguishing Widera on the grounds that it involved the question of
injuries that occurred in utero.257 It also noted several decisions that held
manufacturers of asbestos products liable for injuries to foreseeable third
parties.258 The Appellate Division granted leave and certified the question
of duty to the New York Court of Appeals.259
The Court of Appeals, focusing on the lack of a relationship between
Mrs. Holdampf and the Port Authority, found that there was no duty.260
Unlike the Tennessee Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals
stated that because the Port Authority did not employ Mrs. Holdampf, it did
not have a duty to protect her from the danger caused by her husband’s
The court reasoned that because Mrs.
asbestos-laden clothes.261
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id. at 116–17.
Id. at 117.
Id.
Id. at 117–18.
Id. at 118.
611 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1994).
In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d at 118.
Id. at 118.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 119–22.
Id. at 120.
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Holdampf’s claim was based on nonfeasance, a special relationship had to
exist in order to find that the Port Authority owed a duty to her.262 In this
case, the Port Authority had no relationship with Mrs. Holdampf and,
moreover, was not in the best position to protect her from harm because any
actions it may have taken depended upon Mr. Holdampf’s compliance.263
The Court of Appeals also rejected New Jersey’s emphasis on
foreseeability as an element of duty determinations.264 The court held that
courts should not take foreseeability into account in determining whether a
duty exists; rather, juries should use foreseeability to determine the duty’s
scope.265 Unlike the Tennessee Supreme Court, the New York Court of
Appeals stated that using foreseeability to find duty in this case could lead
to endless liability.266 Instead, the court explained that the only way to curb
this “specter” is to limit a finding of duty to those classes of plaintiffs who
have a special relationship with the defendant.267 In cases that involve
take-home asbestos, there is no special relationship between the defendant
and the injured third party, and therefore no duty exists.
2. Georgia: CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Williams
The Supreme Court of Georgia, agreeing with the New York Court of
Appeals, held that an employer does not owe a duty to third parties who
sustained injuries off the employer’s premises.268 Three children of
different employees brought a negligence claim in federal court against
their fathers’ employer, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), for harms
suffered as a result of their exposure to their fathers’ asbestos-containing
work clothes.269 In addition, one of the employees brought a wrongful
death action claiming that his wife died as a result of the same exposure.270
CSXT filed a motion for summary judgment in both cases, claiming that it
owed no duty to nonemployees to protect them from asbestos exposure
away from the worksite.271
The district court denied the motion, but granted CSXT leave to seek an
interlocutory appeal, because this was a matter of first impression in
Georgia.272 The Eleventh Circuit granted the interlocutory appeal and
certified the question of whether an employer owes a duty to third parties
262. Id. at 119 (noting that in situations of nonfeasance a duty exists only “where there is
a relationship either between the defendant and a third-person tortfeasor that encompasses
defendant’s actual control of the third person’s actions, or between defendant and plaintiff
that requires defendant to protect plaintiff from the conduct of others.” (quoting Hamilton v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 233 (2001))).
263. Id. at 120.
264. See id. at 122 (“Olivo is distinguishable legally in that New Jersey, unlike New
York, relies heavily on foreseeability in its duty analysis.”).
265. Id. at 119.
266. Id. at 122.
267. Id.
268. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. 2005).
269. Id. at 208.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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who sustain harms from employees’ asbestos-containing clothing to the
Supreme Court of Georgia.273
Georgia’s highest court declined to impose a duty because no
relationship existed between the employer and the third parties.274 While
an employer owes its employees a duty to maintain a safe environment, the
plaintiffs did not work for CSXT.275 Like the New York Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court of Georgia stated that foreseeability should not play a
role in determinations of duty.276 Moreover, from a policy perspective, the
court noted that finding liability under these circumstances would “create an
almost infinite universe of potential plaintiffs.”277
3. Michigan: In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth District Court
of Appeals of Texas
The Michigan Supreme Court, in In re Certified Question from the
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals of Texas,278 held that a premise owner
does not owe a duty to injured third parties who had never entered the
premises.279 Between 1954 and 1965, plaintiff Cleveland “John” Roland
worked for independent contractors whom the defendant Ford Motor
Company hired to reline the interiors of blast furnaces.280 The material that
Mr. Roland used to reline the furnaces contained asbestos, which adhered to
his clothing.281 The decedent Carolyn Miller, Mr. Rowland’s stepdaughter,
washed the clothing.282 Doctors diagnosed her with mesothelioma in 1999,
and she died a year later.283
The plaintiffs brought a claim in Texas alleging that Ms. Miller’s
mesothelioma resulted from her exposure to the asbestos that adhered to her
stepfather’s clothing while he was working for Ford.284 After the trial court
denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, a jury found for the
plaintiffs and awarded them $9.5 million.285 Ford then filed a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and after the trial court denied the
motion, Ford appealed to the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals of
Texas.286 The district court certified the question of whether a premises

273. Id.
274. Id. at 209–10.
275. Id. at 209.
276. Id.
277. Id. (quoting Widera v. Ettco Wire and Cable Corp., 611 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571 (App.
Div. 1994)).
278. 740 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 2007).
279. Id. at 209–10.
280. Id. at 210.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. The plaintiffs are the representatives of the decedent’s estate, her stepfather,
daughter, husband, and mother.
284. Id. at 209.
285. Id. at 210.
286. Id.
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owner owes a duty to third parties injured from asbestos exposure off the
premises to the Michigan Supreme Court.287
The Michigan Supreme Court considered multiple factors in determining
that the defendant owed no duty to Ms. Miller.288 The court stated that, in
examining whether a duty existed, it must consider whether the social
benefits of imposing a duty outweigh the costs.289 This involves balancing
factors such as “the relationship of the parties, the foreseeability of the
harm, the burden on the defendant, and the nature of the risk presented.”290
The relationship of the parties, however, represented the most pivotal
factor, because it determined whether the defendant should have acted to
protect the injured party from harm.291 The court noted that although it
should consider foreseeability as one of the factors, it deemed the other
considerations more important.292
The court first considered the relationship between the defendant and Ms.
Miller, and held that it was extremely tenuous.293 Ms. Miller did not work
for the defendant, nor had she ever appeared on the defendant’s
premises.294 The court then considered the burden on the defendant, and
held that the burden would be severe, because the defendant would have to
protect every individual who came into contact with its employees and the
employees of its independent contractors.295 The nature of the risk prong,
however, was serious because of the highly dangerous properties of
asbestos.296 Nevertheless, the court held that the defendant could not
foresee the risk, because during the period when Mr. Roland worked on the
defendant’s premises, the risks relating to asbestos were not well known.297
The four balancing factors thus weighed in favor of finding that no duty
existed.
Like the highest courts of New York and Georgia, the Michigan Supreme
Court also expressed the fear of limitless liability for defendants.298 It
noted that many corporations had already faced bankruptcy because of the
crushing asbestos claims brought against them by employees.299 If liability
was extended to third parties, then the number of plaintiffs would be
uncontrollable and the cost of litigation would debilitate many
287. Id.
288. Id. at 210–12.
289. Id. at 211.
290. Id. (quoting Dyer v. Trachtman, 679 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Mich. 2004)).
291. Id. But see id. at 225 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority incorrectly
stressed the relationship between the parties more than the other factors).
292. Id. at 212–13 (majority opinion).
293. Id. at 216.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 217.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 218. But see id. at 226 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
looking to other courts’ determinations of what was known about asbestos at the time instead
of considering foreseeability in the context of the present case).
298. Id. at 218–19 (majority opinion) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that
asbestos litigation in the United States reached a “crisis” level).
299. Id. at 219; see supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text.
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defendants.300 Accordingly, policy considerations, as well as the four
balancing factors, promoted a finding that landowners did not owe a duty to
warn third parties who have never appeared on the landowner’s premises of
the risks of asbestos.301
Justice Michael F. Cavanagh dissented, arguing first that the majority
should not have even decided the question of duty in this case, and further,
that its analysis was incorrect because a duty existed.302 Justice Cavanagh
criticized the majority for resolving the issue without the benefit of a full
review.303 Because the majority did decide the issue, however, he felt
compelled to state his disagreement with the analysis as well. Justice
Cavanagh first stated that the majority placed an undue emphasis on the
lack of relationship between Ford and Ms. Miller.304 According to Justice
Cavanagh, the court should not consider the relationship as the most
important factor to weigh, but only one among many.305 In any case,
Justice Cavanagh found that a relationship existed between Ms. Miller and
the employer who, knowing the dangerous properties of asbestos, allowed
employees to carry it home.306
Next, he opined that the majority exaggerated the burden that a finding of
duty would impose on future defendants.307 If the majority found that a
duty existed in this particular circumstance, it would not follow that
companies would then face liability for every person that comes into
contact with asbestos carried home on their workers’ clothing.308 Even if a
finding of duty would place a large burden on defendants, Justice Cavanagh
stated that the benefits of “corporate accountability” and a “valued, healthy
society” nevertheless would outweigh that burden, especially considering
the extremely dangerous properties of asbestos.309
Justice Cavanagh also criticized the majority’s decision regarding the
foreseeability of harm to individuals like Ms. Miller.310 He cited several
cases, including Olivo,311 which found that the risks of asbestos were
known during the time that Mr. Roland worked for Ford.312 Moreover,
Justice Cavanagh pointed out that the jury clearly believed that Ford should
have foreseen the harm to Ms. Miller when it found for the plaintiffs, and
300. In re Certified Question, 740 N.W.2d at 218–20. The court noted that competing
policy considerations represented its “ultimate inquiry.” Id. at 218.
301. Id. at 222.
302. Id. at 223–24 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
303. Id. Justice Cavanagh also stated that the Texas court could have simply looked at
Michigan case law to decide the issue. Id. at 223.
304. Id. at 224.
305. Id. at 225
306. Id. (noting that the majority’s view of relationship was “severely curtailed”).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 225–26. Justice Cavanagh states that “the majority needlessly invokes the skyis-falling genre of arguments advanced by commentators who have been openly critical of
asbestos litigation and tort recovery in general.” Id. at 228.
309. Id. at 229.
310. Id. at 226.
311. 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006); see supra Part III.A.1.
312. In re Certified Question, 740 N.W.2d at 226 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
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deciding otherwise undermines the jury’s determination.313 Foreseeability,
he stated, represents a fact-specific determination that the majority should
not have decided.314
4. Delaware: Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
The Delaware Supreme Court, like the New York Court of Appeals,
found that an employer does not owe a duty to protect third parties from
harm because the defendant’s inaction constituted nonfeasance.315 Plaintiff
Bobby Price worked as a maintenance technician for E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. between 1957 and 1991.316 His duties required him to
work with asbestos-containing products. His wife, Patricia Price, was also
exposed to asbestos when she handled his work clothes and consequently
developed an asbestos-related lung disease.317
Mrs. Price filed a complaint against, among other parties, DuPont
alleging that the company caused her injuries by exposing her to
asbestos.318 She then sought to amend her complaint to recharacterize
DuPont’s actions as misfeasance instead of nonfeasance.319 A special
master denied the motion, finding that despite the attempt to recharacterize
DuPont’s actions, the complaint would still fail to state a claim for
misfeasance.320 The Superior Court affirmed, and Mrs. Price appealed.321
The Delaware Supreme Court held that no duty existed because the
defendant’s behavior constituted nonfeasance and no special relationship
existed between the parties.322 The court stated that when an individual
engages in acts of misfeasance, he owes a general duty to those whom his
In contrast, when the person’s acts constitute
conduct harms.323
nonfeasance, no duty exists to protect others unless there is a special
relationship between the parties.324 The court held that the defendant’s
failure to prevent Mr. Price from taking his clothes home, or its failure to
warn of the dangers of asbestos, constituted nonfeasance.325 An attempt to
recharacterize those actions without presenting any new facts does not
transform acts of nonfeasance into acts of misfeasance.326 Because the

313. Id. at 226–27.
314. Id. at 227.
315. Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 170 (Del. 2011).
316. Id. at 163.
317. Id. at 163–65.
318. Id. at 163.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 166.
321. Id. at 164.
322. Id. at 170.
323. Id. at 167; see supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
324. Price, 26 A.3d at 167 (“[I]n a case involving misfeasance, the defendant’s duty is
automatic, whereas in a case involving nonfeasance, the defendant’s duty arises only if there
is a legally significant ‘special relationship’ between the parties.”); see supra notes 57–60
and accompanying text.
325. Price, 26 A.3d at 168–69.
326. Id. at 168.
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defendant had no special relationship to Mrs. Price, a third party, the court
held that the defendant owed her no duty.327
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Carolyn Berger stated that the majority
should have found that DuPont’s actions constituted misfeasance.328
Justice Berger noted that for nonfeasance, a defendant has not created a new
risk for the plaintiff, but has simply failed to step in to benefit the
plaintiff.329 In the present case, DuPont’s affirmative act of releasing the
asbestos clearly created a new risk of harm to Mrs. Price.330 Justice Berger
contended that the majority should not focus on specific instances of
inaction, such as failing to warn Mr. and Mrs. Price, to find that DuPont’s
conduct constituted nonfeasance.331 Instead, the company’s actions as a
whole, which comprised utilizing asbestos at its worksite and allowing it to
leave the worksite on employees’ clothes, demonstrated misfeasance.332
Justice Berger also noted that once the court characterized the
defendant’s actions as misfeasance, it needed to determine whether the
defendants could foresee harm to the plaintiff.333 Assuming Mrs. Price’s
allegations were true, DuPont knew the hazards of asbestos, that employees
could easily transport asbestos on their clothing, and therefore, that
individuals like Mrs. Price could sustain injuries from asbestos exposure.334
Justice Berger would have therefore found that DuPont should have
foreseen harm to Mrs. Price and would have reversed the trial court’s
decision.335
IV. DELINEATING A CLEARER APPROACH TO DUTY DETERMINATIONS IN
TAKE-HOME ASBESTOS CASES
Part IV.A argues that the standard applied by all six states is too factspecific and uncertain. Part IV.B suggests that the Third Restatement’s
approach represents a clearer method.
A. The Present Duty Standard Is Unworkable
Part IV.A.1 asserts that when courts decide whether a defendant owes a
duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs, they often usurp the role of the jury
by engaging in fact-specific inquiries. Part IV.A.2 criticizes courts that
hold that no duty exists for burying their policy determinations in doctrines
like nonfeasance, unforeseeability, and the lack of a relationship between
the parties.

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id. at 170.
Id. at 171 (Berger, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id. at 172–73.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id.
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1. Foreseeability’s “Schizophrenic Existence” in Duty Determinations
When determining whether a duty attaches in take-home asbestos cases,
courts often engage in fact-specific inquiries about foreseeability.336 The
question of duty, unlike breach and proximate cause, represents one that a
court must determine as a matter of law.337 Accordingly, whether a
defendant owed a plaintiff a duty of reasonable care should not depend on
the particular facts of a case. Nevertheless, courts will often question
whether a defendant could foresee harm to a particular plaintiff or class of
plaintiffs.338 This analysis involves necessarily fact-specific inquiries into
whether the defendant should have known about the hazards of asbestos
during the time of the plaintiff’s exposure, whether the defendant provided
any laundry or shower facilities to its workers, and the extent of the
plaintiff’s exposure.339
Decisions based on foreseeability do not provide clear precedents for
future cases. When a court determines that a defendant either could or
could not have foreseen harm to a plaintiff, the court limits its holding to
the facts of that case.340 Other courts later facing the same issue can reach a
different interpretation of foreseeability simply by distinguishing the facts
from the previous case.341 Thus, using foreseeability may help to resolve
the particular case before the court, but it does nothing to resolve the larger
conflict about duty to third-party asbestos plaintiffs.
Duty determinations that use foreseeability can also cause inconsistencies
between the judge and the jury, who can reach different conclusions about
the same set of facts.342 As Part I.A.2–3 explained, foreseeability plays a
role in the jury’s determination about the reasonableness of the defendant’s
When judges decide
conduct and the scope of his liability.343
foreseeability, their conclusions overlap with inquiries that the court should
leave to the jury when it determines breach and proximate cause.344 As
Justice Holder pointed out, such decisions represent judgments about

336. See supra Part III.
337. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 61–64, 199–202, 226–29 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 66–68, 199–202, 229–30 and accompanying text; see also In re
Certified Question from the Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206, 226 (Mich.
2007) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (noting that “it should be self-evident that a finding
regarding foreseeability must be based on the evidence specific to a particular case”).
340. See supra notes 67–68, 199–202, 229–30 and accompanying text. In Olivo, for
example, the court found a duty based on the “particularized foreseeability of harm to
plaintiff’s wife, who ordinarily would perform typical household chores that would include
laundering the work clothes worn by her husband.” 895 A.2d 1143, 1150 (N.J. 2006).
341. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also In re Certified Question, 740
N.W.2d at 217 n.17 (noting that limiting a duty holding to the particular case before the
court “is not how a court of law properly determines the existence, or nonexistence, of a
legal duty, for such a determination will apply not only in the instant case but in the next 500
cases as well”).
342. See supra notes 313–14 and accompanying text.
343. See supra Part I.A.2–3.
344. See supra notes 66–67, 310–14 and accompanying text.
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behavioral norms in the community, and a group of twelve people is much
better qualified to make such conclusions than one judge.345
2. Courts Bury Policy Determinations in Doctrine
Although most of the states that found no duty made references to the
public policy considerations that informed their decisions, they couched
these considerations in various doctrines like a lack of foreseeability,
nonfeasance, and the absence of a relationship between the parties.346
Foreseeability, as mentioned in Part IV.A.1, represents a fact-specific
inquiry that courts should leave to juries.347 Characterizing a defendant’s
actions as nonfeasance, and denying duty because no relationship existed
between the parties, distorts basic tort law principles. When a defendant
engages in acts of nonfeasance, he has not created a new risk of harm to a
plaintiff, but has merely failed to protect him from an already existing
harm.348 In take-home asbestos cases, defendants create the risk by
exposing workers to asbestos, which the workers then carry home on their
person and clothing.349 Thus, the defendants have not engaged in
nonfeasance because they created a dangerous environment that resulted in
third-party exposure.350
The real concern for courts that make “no duty” determinations in takehome asbestos cases lies in the perceived endless liability that defendants
would face if the court found that a duty existed. The highest courts of
New York and Georgia worried about the “specter of endless liability”351
and the “infinite universe of potential plaintiffs.”352 Nevertheless, the
courts determined that duty did not exist because of nonfeasance, lack of a
relationship between the parties, or lack of foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff.353 These doctrines obfuscate the policy decisions that truly inform
courts’ determinations. When courts expressly state their policy reasons
instead of engaging in multi-factored tests, they contribute to greater
transparency in take-home asbestos cases.354
B. The Third Restatement’s Method Represents a Better Solution
Part IV.B.1 argues that the Third Restatement results in clearer duty
determinations in take-home asbestos cases because it establishes a default
345. See supra notes 237–40 and accompanying text.
346. See supra Part III.B; see also DOBBS, supra note 18, § 227, at 579 (“Rules declaring
that no duty exists . . . are expressions of ‘global’ policy . . . rules of law having the quality
of generality.”).
347. See supra Part IV.A.1.
348. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 189–93, 208–12, 249–51, 269–70, 280–83, 316–17 and
accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 221–24, 328–32 and accompanying text; see also Satterfield v.
Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 356–57 (Tenn. 2008).
351. See supra notes 266–67 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Part III.B.
354. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
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duty of reasonable care and leaves fact-specific inquiries like foreseeability
to the jury. Part IV.B.2 maintains that the Third Restatement contributes to
transparency in “no duty” decisions and encourages courts to take their “no
duty” determinations more seriously.
1. Applying the Third Restatement Leads to Clearer, Less FactSpecific Decisions
The Third Restatement’s approach to duty determinations removes
factual inquiries from the judge and shifts them to the jury. The
Restatement eliminates the use of fact-specific inquiries like
foreseeability.355 It instead states that “[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to
exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical
harm.”356 It thus establishes a default duty of reasonable care when a
defendant’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of a plaintiff’s harm.357 As Justice
Holder stated, the Third Restatement’s approach removes the “freefloating” analysis in which courts consider whether a defendant could
foresee harm to a plaintiff.358 Instead, in most circumstances, the
foreseeability analysis shifts to the jury, who can better evaluate the specific
facts of a case in the context of breach and proximate cause. This shift also
removes any overlap that the court and the jury may have on the issue of
foreseeability, as occurred in Michigan.359
The Third Restatement makes courts’ inquiries much simpler when they
determine that a duty existed, which results in clearer legal precedent.
Courts would not need to engage in multi-factored balancing tests to reach
their conclusions.360 When courts incorporate factors like foreseeability,
the nature of the relationship, or the ease with which a defendant could have
provided warnings, they overstep the boundary between questions of law
and questions of fact,361 and generate a murky legal analysis.362 The Third
Restatement’s method, on the other hand, represents a clear analysis that
instructs courts facing take-home asbestos cases to presume that a duty of
reasonable care exists.363
2. Third Restatement’s Approach Results in More Transparent
Policy Decisions
The Third Restatement’s approach encourages courts that determine that
no duty existed to clearly state their public policy considerations. Although
it states that courts generally should presume that a duty of reasonable care
355. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
358. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 378 (Tenn. 2008).
359. See supra notes 310–14 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 203–04, 225–30, 288–92 and accompanying text.
361. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 776–78.
362. See supra notes 68, 244–45 and accompanying text; see also Cardi, supra note 28, at
740–41, 792–93.
363. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
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exists, it qualifies that presumption by stating that, “[i]n exceptional cases,
when an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or
limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the
defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires
This approach recognizes that courts often use
modification.”364
ambiguous legal doctrines to hold that defendants do not owe a duty to
take-home asbestos plaintiffs.365 Instead, the Third Restatement suggests
that courts should state their true concerns unequivocally by holding that
the possibility of adding to an already massive litigation militates in favor
of finding that employers and premises owners generally owe no duty to
third-party plaintiffs.366
The Third Restatement does not prevent courts from finding no duty, but
it does force them to consider their decisions more seriously, and will likely
lead to fewer “no duty” holdings. The Restatement suggests that courts
should make “no duty” policy determinations only in “exceptional cases,”
and it is not clear whether take-home asbestos cases fit this category,
because employers and premises owners frequently know of the risks that
asbestos poses to those who have regular contact with it.367 Courts would
therefore have to articulate clear policy concerns for limiting these
defendants’ liability.
This approach may result in judges being reluctant to express policy
concerns as explicitly as the Third Restatement suggests, because they do
not want to step on the toes of legislators.368 New York, Georgia, and
Michigan, however, have all expressed the important role that policy played
in their decisions.369 The Michigan Supreme Court has even expressly
stated that it considered policy the “ultimate inquiry” in its duty
determination.370 Courts have thus already advanced policy concerns, and
should not have to hide behind unclear legal doctrines to deny duty. If, on
the other hand, the court has weak policy concerns, then the case should go
to a jury to determine liability.
If a court does not want to make a policy-based determination about
denying duty, it can still decide breach or proximate cause as a matter of
law.371 A court can sometimes determine that a defendant unable to foresee
harm to a plaintiff acted reasonably, so no breach occurred.372 Similarly, a

364. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see also Cardi, supra note 28, at 789
(stating that courts “will thus be guided by the carrot of Section 7(b) and the stick of Section
7(a) to write opinions that transparently explain duty decisions in terms of public policy”).
365. See supra notes 260–63, 274–76, 288–97, 322–27 and accompanying text.
366. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 7 cmt. j (2005) (noting that “articulating the policy or principle at stake will contribute to
transparency, clarity, and better understanding of tort law”).
367. See supra notes 103–11 and accompanying text.
368. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 763 (“Many courts feel squeamish about deciding tort
cases on the basis of reasoning that arguably is proper only for the legislative branch.”).
369. See supra notes 266–67, 277, 298–301 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 300–01 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
372. See supra Part I.A.2.
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court can deem the harm too remote, and hold that there was therefore no
proximate causation.373
This avenue, however, requires a court to observe the deferential “no
reasonable jury” standard.374
Like the requirement that policy
considerations should come into play only in “exceptional circumstances,”
this requirement also forces courts to treat “no breach” and “no proximate
cause” determinations seriously. Exempting the defendants from liability in
cases where the plaintiffs have suffered diseases like mesothelioma
demands significant consideration. The Third Restatement would therefore
require courts to take a necessary pause before making “no duty”
determinations. They could still hold that employers and landowners do not
face liability for injuries to third-party plaintiffs, but they would have to
clearly delineate the policy reasons for denying duty, or satisfy the
heightened “no reasonable jury” standard for denying breach or proximate
cause.
CONCLUSION
In courts’ efforts either to impose a duty or deny a duty in take-home
asbestos cases, they have engaged in unclear analyses and set bad
precedents for future cases. Courts that find that a duty existed rely on factspecific inquiries like foreseeability that usurp the role of the jury, while
courts that deny duty hide their policy determinations behind legal doctrines
like nonfeasance and a lack of relationship between the parties. The Third
Restatement’s method sets a clearer standard. It encourages courts to
presume a default duty of reasonable care, which will send more take-home
asbestos cases to juries who can better determine liability. It also prompts
courts to take “no liability” decisions more seriously. Unless a court can
articulate clear policy reasons for denying duty, or can meet the “no
reasonable jury” standard when denying breach or proximate cause, it must
adopt the default duty of reasonable care.

373. See supra Part I.A.3.
374. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 774–78.

